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TRACKING INFERENCES IS NOT ENOUGH: 
THE GIVEN AS TIE-BREAKER 
Marc CHAMPAGNE 
 
ABSTRACT: Most inferentialists hope to bypass givenness by tracking the conditionals 
claimants are implicitly committed to. I argue that this approach is underdetermined 
because one can always construct parallel trees of conditionals. I illustrate this using the 
Müller-Lyer illusion and touching a table. In the former case, the lines are either even 
or uneven; in the latter case, a moving hand will either sweep through or be halted. For 
each possibility, we can rationally foresee consequents. However, I argue that, until and 
unless we benefit from what is given in experience, we cannot know whether to affirm 
the antecedents of those conditionals. 




Empiricism appeals heavily to observation(s), but this idea of letting knowledge 
rest on observation(s) is now widely regarded as a “myth.” The epithet “myth of 
the Given” was famously introduced by Wilfrid Sellars.1 Sellars did not deny the 
existence of sensations as non-propositional deliverances of the senses. He did, 
however, argue that they cannot play the role of the given, for they are non-
propositional and hence cannot serve as foundations for our knowledge. On this 
view, sensations cause but cannot justify beliefs. This view has since inspired a 
whole school of thought.2 However, against the view and its school, I want to 
argue that sensations can cause and justify beliefs. 
                                                                
1 Wilfrid Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” in Minnesota Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science: Volume 1, eds. Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1956), 253-329.  
2 See Chauncey Maher, The Pittsburgh School of Philosophy: Sellars, McDowell, Brandom (New 
York: Routledge, 2012). There is even talk of “myths” in the plural, as in Carl B. Sachs, 
Intentionality and the Myths of the Given: Between Pragmatism and Phenomenology (London: 
Pickering & Chatto, 2014). 
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I am certainly not the first to say so.3 But, the pro-Given position deserves a 
fresh round of exposure. As it happens, I think I have a few good arguments to 
offer. Since I do not want to veer into a literature review, let me jump right in 
with those arguments. 
Reasoning in the Dark 
Consider the Müller-Lyer illusion. In this image, two lines of equal length are 
juxtaposed side by side for comparison. Located at the tips of each line are arrow 
heads, the pair of one line pointing inward, the other pointing outward. The net 
effect of this simple configuration is that, when seen, the lines appear to be of 
unequal lengths. The inward-pointing arrows (seemingly) elongate the line on 
which they are appended, while the outward-pointing ones (seemingly) compress 
theirs. Hence, despite being identical in length when measured with a ruler, a 
subject looking at these two lines will nevertheless experience them as being 
uneven. 
A causal episode spawns an experience of uneven lines but, once that 
content is incorporated holistically within the rest of a subject’s beliefs, the subject 
can no longer cite the experience in order to establish the merit of her claims. As 
John McDowell explains,  
In the Müller-Lyer illusion, one’s experience represents the two lines as being 
unequally long, but someone in the know will refrain from judging that that is 
how things are.4  
Thus, looking at the situation from an epistemological perspective, we seem to 
have a clear-cut substantiation of the idea that appeals to “the given” are 
powerless. What really matters is inferential prowess in what Sellars called “the 
logical space of reasons.”5 In this space, “mere” looking is supposedly of no help. 
As a means of illustrating why this inferentialist movement away from 
observational givenness is wrong, consider a subject who has no clue what the 
Müller-Lyer illusion is. She has no prior knowledge of this object, neither “by 
description” nor “by acquaintance.” Let this subject sit alone in a quiet room 
equipped with an image-projector. The Müller-Lyer image is then displayed, with 
ample noise-free time for her to see what is before her. We now turn off the 
                                                                
3 See for example Richard Schantz, “The Role of Sensory Experience in Epistemic Justification: 
A Problem for Coherentism,” Erkenntnis 50 (1999): 177-191. 
4 John H. McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 11. 
5 Sellars, “Empiricism,” section 36. 
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projector and close the lights in the room, such that she is immersed in total 
darkness. At this point, a voice explains to her the following argument: 
1) The Müller-Lyer lines appear uneven 
2) The Müller-Lyer lines are even 
3) Illusions are not as they appear 
Therefore, 
4) The Müller-Lyer lines are an illusion 
Suppose that, at the completion of this intellectual commerce, our subject becomes 
convinced that the lines were in fact even, despite what she saw. She has dispelled 
an illusion, and now endorses a truth. Is the experience which our subject enjoyed 
when the image was visible really impotent in the space of reasons? 
Someone could say that, because premises 1 and 3 talk of appearances, they 
clearly play some role in the deliberations. Indeed, the best thinkers on the matter 
(e.g., Sellars, McDowell, and Brandom) each have a great deal to say about how 
appearances and thoughts and claims about appearances figure in justifying beliefs. 
As Brandom explains, Sellars held that, when one says that something merely 
“looks” a certain way, “one is not endorsing a claim, but withholding endorsement 
from one.”6 I agree completely with this account. However, I think it overlooks 
something: we switch to a non-committal idiom only occasionally. We do not, for 
example, use it when describing a square as straight-edged. So, appearance talk is 
subject to conditions of application that sometimes make it normatively 
inappropriate. The point of my example about the argument in the dark is to show 
that inference alone cannot determine this appropriateness. 
Of course, my experimental design presents the argument only once the 
image projector has been shut off, so in that sense it is trivially true that the 
exercise did not involve the image, which figures only in absentia. However, can 
one really conclude from this that the observational episode played no part in the 
conclusion which the argument ultimately recommends? I argue that both during 
and after the image-projection, givenness is crucial. So, to give my set-up a 
revealing twist, what if, instead of showing my subject that the lines appear 
uneven, I merely told her? 
If one wants to persuade someone that the Müller-Lyer image is an illusion, 
then whatever shape the argument takes, one of the premises will have to be that 
“The Müller-Lyer lines appear uneven.” Yet, what would happen to that argument 
                                                                
6 Robert B. Brandom, From Empiricism to Expressivism: Brandom Reads Sellars (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2015), 108. 
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if the lines appeared even? Reasoning alone might establish the formal validity of 
the inference presented in the darkness, but the only way for the subject to assess 
the soundness of the argument is for her to take advantage of the experiential 
deliverances which alone can establish whether the first premise is true. Indeed, it 
is by no means obvious to armchair reflection that tagging arrow-heads on a line 
lengthens or shortens that line. Hence, the merit of the inference as knowledge 
will remain undetermined – until and unless a subject sneaks a peak at some 
quality tenaciously asserting its own standing. 
Note that, by design, I have not provided an illustration of the Müller-Lyer 
illusion. In so doing, I have positioned the reader in the equivalent of the dark 
room, but with no prior projection made. Let those who know what my argument 
is about determine for themselves to what extent their acquaintance contributes to 
their assessment of my reasons. Familiarity with the lexicon and grammar I have 
employed will not by itself allow one to determine whether appending pairs of 
arrow heads to a line shortens or lengthens that line. If someone unfamiliar with 
what I have said were to confidently judge my claims as right or wrong, her 
confidence would be mere chutzpah – a mock-judgement, we might say. 
Part of what we do when we ask for and supply reasons is “make explicit” 
the inferences that we commit to in making a claim.7 Now, the situation I am 
discussing is clear-cut: either the lines are even or they are not. So, in principle, 
we might be able to map out what a community would expect from an agent 
making either claim. If the lines are uneven, then were one to draw perpendicular 
lines at the ends of the longer arrow, those new lines should pass by the shorter 
arrow without touching it. If, on the contrary, the arrow lines are even, then 
perpendicular additions should touch both of their tips. Geometrical examples like 
these are homey, but a plethora of more inventive conditionals sprout from each 
possibility. For example, if the lines appear uneven, then a savvy marketer could 
add pointed tips to her products in order to affect consumer choices. I agree with 
the inferentialist that the ability to foresee conditionals like these is an important 
marker of semantic entitlement. Simply put, if you don’t know (at least some of) 
what is implicit in what you say, then you don’t know what you are saying. Or, to 
dress the same idea in fancier jargon,  
                                                                
7 Robert B. Brandom, Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994). 
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[t]he capacity to use the underlying descriptive vocabulary can be 
straightforwardly (indeed, algorithmically) transformed into the capacity to 
use conditionals involving that vocabulary.8  
Yet, I argue that all these conditionals will just sit there, unused, until and 
unless one is given an observational cause to either affirm or deny their 
antecedents. Otherwise, one has no way to figure out which of this double book-
keeping is right or wrong. 
The inferentialist might reply that conditionals can be endorsed without 
endorsing their antecedents. That is true. After all, I happen to assent to “If aliens 
visit the Earth, then we will need galactic ambassadors” without assenting to 
“Aliens visit the Earth.” Still, whenever I endorse a conditional, I make myself 
rationally open to a potential modus ponens. Inferentialism is at its best when it 
stresses how “[t]he responsibility one undertakes by applying a concept is a task 
responsibility: a commitment to do something.”9 That said, the application of a 
concept draws on the hybrid faculty of judgment, so it cannot rely solely on an 
economy between general concepts to determine the appropriateness of a 
particular case. 
A person can be credited with rationality for being able to list (some of) the 
inferences entailed by what she claims, but this ability and the ascription it 
licenses do nothing to establish whether a specific claim is true. Hence, I submit 
that the only way to break the stalemate between anticipated consequences is to 
see whether their antecedents should be affirmed. So long as arguments are truth-
preserving, not truth-generating, stacking more inferences will not fix things. 
Discovering how things actually are is an achievement. In the Müller-Lyer 
image, this achievement is quickly attained by a few diagrammatic manipulations 
(like dragging the lines so that they overlap, or adding perpendicular lines so that 
they intersect). But, to benefit from those manipulations, one must take stock of 
their outcome. The moral, then, is this: whether the lines indeed appear unequal is 
ascertained by looking, and whether they are in fact equal is also ascertained by 
looking. Either way, the claims and inferences are answerable to the experiential 
qualities before one. 
It might be worth recalling that philosophers who reject the given do so, 
not in response to some tangible crisis, but on account of a technical let-down: it is 
not propositional, and therefore cannot enter into an argument. Arguments are 
                                                                
8 Robert B. Brandom, From Empiricism to Expressivism: Brandom Reads Sellars (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2015), 191. 
9 Robert B. Brandom, Perspectives on Pragmatism: Classical, Recent, and Contemporary 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 2. 
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important, but since they are truth-preserving and not truth-generating, they can 
accomplish only so much. I thus think that speculative misgivings about the given 
are misplaced. It seems wiser to say that  
[t]he verbal argument is at most only stage setting; the heart of the drama is the 
invocation of experience and, indeed, the attempt to register accurately the felt 
force of relevant experience.10  
Pursuing with this, all I can do by way of argument is doctor a balanced set of 
considerations and let one ascertain whether one’s judgement about the even or 
uneven lines is supported by something inside or outside this article. 
Conclusion 
I have argued that, because the given can cause and justify beliefs, tracking 
inferences is not enough. Since my point is a general one, I want to close by 
restating it using an ordinary experience. 
Imagine that I propose to sweep my arm so that the path of my arm 
intersects with the position of a table. Will the table block me? Again, this is a 
clear-cut question with two possible outcomes. Suppose I make a commitment and 
verbally proclaim: “My arm will sweep right through the table.” Am I right or 
wrong? One might answer that any sober adult who competently deploys words 
like “arm” and “table” ought to know that, when assembled in the proposition “My 
arm will sweep right through the table,” those words yield a falsehood. Hence, 
because I speak a natural language, I have inherited a store of well-confirmed 
habits which allow me to fruitfully forecast eventual states of affairs solely on the 
basis of vocabulary and grammar (These forecasts can be expressed as conditionals. 
I ought to know, for instance, that if my arm is halted, then I will be prevented 
from using it to scratch my knee under the table, and so on). Still, call me 
incredulous, but I like to check up on conventional wisdom once in a while, to see 
whether those habits indeed track the occurrences they are supposed to. So, while 
I am a competent user of “arm” and “table,” it is not irrational for me to test what 
happens when the objects of those sign-vehicles are joined in a relation matching 
a proposition. 
The result of such an experiment is quickly revealed for all to see: my 
sweeping arm is halted by the table. Yet, those who try to replace the given by 
inferences must make a longer detour to justify this. I have argued that their 
project cannot succeed, because inferences always allow one to map out two (or 
more) mutually-exclusive detours. As a philosophy of language, tracking such 
                                                                
10 Vincent M. Colapietro, “Peirce Today,” Pragmatism Today 1 (2010): 11. 
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inferential consequences constitutes a genuine achievement. But, as an 
epistemology, it amounts to little, unless we are given the means to judge which of 
the competing inferences have true conclusions. Givenness, whatever else it might 
be, is the tie-breaker.11 
                                                                
11 I want to thank Robert Brandom, Henry Jackman, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, Erkki Kilpinen, 
Henrik Rydenfelt, Serge Robert, Claude Panaccio, Patrice Philie, and audience members at the 
Helsinki Metaphysical Club. 
